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Determinants of Multimedia, Entertainment, and Business 
Software Copyright Piracy: A Cross-national Study 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines cross-national variations in piracy of U.S. copyright related products in 
the multimedia, entertainment, and software industry. To determine which economic, legal, 
and social factors cause the considerable differences in piracy of U.S. copyright industries’ 
products in individual countries, we tested 4 industry models. We find that for most industries 
piracy can be explained by the risk profile of the country involved (signalling economic and 
political stability and growth potential) and the existence of a strong intellectual property 
rights system. Furthermore, for the four analysed copyright-based industries considerable 
variation in piracy exists between geographic regions. This study shows that disaggregation of 
the copyright piracy data by industry is helpful in analysing and understanding piracy.  
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Introduction 
Copyright piracy has become a major issue in trade negotiations - for example within the 
World Trade Organization - and in the strategies of entertainment, multimedia, and software 
companies. Copyright piracy not only affects the economic position of these companies, but it 
may also influence the development of many national economies (Husted, 2000). 
Industrialized countries emphasize the need to increase the protection offered to property 
rights for creative products. Samuelson (1999) and Stegemann (2000) mentioned that in 
particular US companies with strong copyright interests and their partners are shaping the 
intellectual-property-related trade diplomacy of the United States in the World Trade 
Organization. These companies have vigorously argued that inadequate copyright protection 
would threaten the basic incentive of copyrights and would jeopardize investments in the 
creation and innovation of products in business, literature, music, arts, and science 
(Samuelson, 1996; Stolpe, 2000). The companies in the copyright-based industries have in 
common that their products could be imitated and copied at a relatively low cost (Gallegos, 
1999; Stolpe, 2000). The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), a coalition 
consisting of seven U.S. copyright industry representative trade associations established in 
1984, estimated that the revenue losses due to illegal copying experienced by the U.S. 
copyright-based entertainment and multimedia industries are more than eight billion US 
dollars every year (IIPA, 2000). The copyright-dependent industries therefore emphasize the 
importance of strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights internationally and 
promote the cross-border harmonization of intellectual property rights regimes (Singer, 
Calton, and Singer, 2001). Although there is considerable concern among governments and 
companies about the impact and consequences of copyright piracy and protection in the 
creative industries, the literature discussing these issues is ambiguous. 
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Economists, politicians, legal scholars, and other professionals related to creative industries 
are still debating the effects of unauthorized copying on society and companies and the need 
to prevent illegal activities. A large group of studies are concerned with the influence that 
strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights will have on society. In this 
context, researchers have considered the social and economic developments of an economy 
under various enforcement and protection systems. For instance, on the one hand, Gould and 
Gruben (1996) found that intellectual property rights foster the economic growth of a society. 
On the other hand, several other studies found that in particular southern countries have little 
incentive to protect the property rights of industrialized countries but rather allow piracy to 
stimulate their economy (Deardorff, 1992, 1995; Yang, 1998; Markussen, 2001). Dunning 
(1993), Seyoum (1996) and Mille (1997) showed that the protection of intellectual property 
rights is positively related to rates of foreign direct investments and innovations in a country. 
At the same time, the diffusion and adoption of a new technology can also be speeded up 
when intellectual property protection is weaker. A rapid diffusion of knowledge spurs 
complementary and cumulative innovations that result in a rapid adoption of and large 
demand for a new technology (Burke, 2000; Tang and Tunzelmann, 2000). The evidence 
regarding the effect of intellectual property rights protection on society is therefore 
inconclusive. 
Another group of studies examines the strategic behavior of companies and the impact of 
unauthorized copying of their products on their performance. Again the findings are 
ambiguous. Studies by for instance IIPA (2000), Gallegos (1999) and Simon (1996) 
emphasized that piracy is harmful to companies in copyright-based industries. As a result of 
piracy, companies lose sales and receive lower revenues. Furthermore, by not knowing the 
users of pirated products, companies also lose opportunities to cross-sell their other products 
and capitalize on any ideas from illegal users for improving the product or developing new 
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products (Givon, Mahajan and Muller, 1995). However, other studies did not confirm these 
findings. A company’s most profitable strategy may indeed be to encourage imitation when 
the size of the user base influences the perceived quality of the product (e.g. Liebowitz, 1985; 
Conner and Rumelt, 1991; Takeyama, 1994; Conner, 1995). The company then experiences 
positive consumption or network externalities due to piracy because it results in an increase in 
the number of individuals using the product (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Takeyama, 
1997; Shy and Thisse, 1999). 
For decisions on strategic positioning, exports, and foreign direct investment behavior, 
copyright-based firms need to know what types of countries provide strong copyright 
protection. Although the US are most strongly insisting on higher protection standards in 
developing countries (Markusen 2001), there appear to be considerable differences in piracy 
rates between industries and countries. Even industrialized countries show substantial 
differences in piracy (Gallegos, 1999; Husted, 2000; Legrand 1998).  
Surprisingly little is known about how intellectual property rights protection is actually 
determined and which economic, legal, and social factors contribute to this protection. 
Studying the determinants of copyright piracy rates and the estimated companies’ revenue 
losses suffered abroad due to piracy would be useful for understanding the strategy and policy 
initiatives to be undertaken by the copyright-based industries and the governments. This 
current study extends existing studies by examining the cross-national variation in piracy in 
four US copyright-based industries: business software applications, record and musical 
compositions, motion pictures, and entertainment software (e.g. Burke, 1996; Husted, 2000; 
Marron and Steel, 2000). We not only look at piracy rates, but also at the estimations of the 
revenue losses suffered by the creative industries resulting from piracy of their products 
abroadi. We concentrate on the US because of its size in copyright related products and the 
availability of data. Therefore first the core US copyright-based industries are introduced. 
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After that we discuss the extent of piracy in several countries. The next section develops a 
conceptual framework and hypotheses that explain the differences across countries in piracy 
rates and revenue losses. The following section presents the data. Then we show the 
econometric findings in order to determine which of the hypotheses are supported, followed 
by a discussion of the findings. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the last section. 
 
The US copyright industries 
The US core copyright-based industries broadly comprise of eight industries: motion pictures 
(television, theatrical, and home video); recording (records, tapes, and CDs); music 
publishing; computer software applications (both for business and entertainment); books, 
journals, and newspaper publishing; radio, television, and cable broadcasting; legitimate 
theater; and advertising (IIAP, 2001). These industries create copyrighted works as their 
primary product. The economic contribution of these industries to the US economy is 
substantial. Siwek (2000) showed that those core copyright-based industries accounted for 4.9 
percent of U.S. GDP in 1999, and that in the last two decades their share in GDP grew twice 
as fast annually as the remainder of the economy. Currently, 3.24 percent of all US employees 
find work in these industries, amounting to 4.3 million workers. The international market for 
copyright protected materials has shown considerable growth. Therefore, the copyright-based 
industries’ foreign sales and exports (estimated to be at least 79.65 billion US dollars in 1999) 
continue to be larger than the exports of almost all other U.S. leading industries, such as 
chemicals and allied products, automobiles, aircraft, and agriculture (IIPA, 2001). However, 
the most important weakness of these creative industries relates to the ease with which their 
products can be (illegally) copied and sold. Recently, the increase in copying related 
innovations has further facilitated piracy and as a consequence may have a negative effect on 
the financial results of the creative companies. 
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A Worldwide Piracy Problem 
These developments have prompted a desire for international copyright legislation. As part of 
the IIPA efforts to protect the US copyright-based industries, it annually reports the 
deficiencies of the copyright regimes of countries where the U.S. copyright-based industries 
suffered the mostii. These countries are ranked on the Special 301 lists according to the 
importance of monitoring their intellectual property practices by the US (IIPA, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001).  
  
------------Insert Table 1 about here----------------- 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the estimated piracy rates for four creative industries in 
different countries for the year 1999: motion pictures; sound recording and musical 
compositions; business software applications, and entertainment softwareiii. Appendix A 
describes the construction of the piracy data for these four US copyright-based industries. As 
shown by the standard deviation values and the range values in this table, the piracy rates for a 
particular creative industry vary substantially between countries. In some countries, virtually 
all motion pictures have been pirated. Vietnam, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Latvia, for example, 
had piracy rates of 95% or more in 1999. Other countries, for instance, Greece, Korea, and 
Italy, had piracy rates in these materials below 25%. However, looking at the business 
software applications piracy rate then Greece no longer has the lowest rate but is positioned 
somewhere in the middle. Now the Czech Republic (42%), Israel (44%), and Italy (44%) have 
the lowest piracy rates, while China (91%), the Russian Federation (89%) and Vietnam (98%) 
have the highest. The average entertainment software piracy rate is more than 78% for the 
monitored countries. The lowest rank country is El Salvador with a piracy rate of 50% for 
entertainment software materials. Malaysia (99%) and the former Soviet Union members 
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(95% or more) are top-rank countries when it comes to piracy in this industry. The average 
sound recording and musical compositions piracy rate of the countries listed in the 301 Report 
is approximately 50% but the standard deviation is high, with rates ranging from 8% for 
Czech Republic to 95% for Brazil and Ukraine.  
Although the piracy rates differ significantly within and between countries for these four 
industries, they give insufficient information to draw conclusions on the economic effects of 
unauthorized production and distribution of materials for personal and/or business purposes. 
We need to understand the revenue losses suffered by the US copyright-based companies to 
fully comprehend the economic effect caused by illegal copying. IIPA also reports estimates 
of these losses. These data have to be carefully interpreted because they may overestimate the 
incurred loss. Firstly, loss revenue is usually estimated by multiplying the legitimate price of 
the product by the estimated number of pirated copies. However, many of these copies would 
not have been purchased at the legitimate price (Marron and Steel, 2000). Secondly, 
companies may also experience positive network externalities due to piracy resulting from an 
increase in the critical mass. Given that no other data are available, these estimates currently 
provide the best insights in the financial consequences of piracy for the creative industries.  
There exists a very weak relationship between the estimated dollar revenue losses suffered by 
the US copyright-based industries in foreign countries and the piracy rates. The average 
correlation between piracy rates and associated revenue losses is only 0.15 and statistically 
not significantly different from zero. It is therefore possible that considerable revenue losses 
suffered by US creative companies due to piracy occur in countries that have low piracy rates. 
To fully understand the total impact of piracy it is necessary to compare the estimates of the 
revenue losses in each country as well as the piracy rates for each industry abroad. The 
average estimated revenue losses abroad for the four US creative industries are reported in 
table 2. 
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------------Insert Table 2 about here----------------- 
 
We see that the largest revenue losses occur in the software industries. The entertainment 
software industry both has the highest mean and the highest standard deviation, signaling 
considerable revenue losses for US firms. According to IIPA (2001), the estimated worldwide 
total revenue loss for this US industry amounts to at least 2.9 billion US dollars. China creates 
the highest revenue loss for the entertainment software companies amounting to almost 1.4 
billion US dollars, while countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala show the lowest 
revenue losses (0.1 million US dollars). Furthermore, the estimated revenue losses suffered by 
US creative companies caused by unauthorized production and distribution of the business 
software applications is also the highest in China (437.20 million US dollars), although now 
closely followed by Italy (338.40 million US dollars) and Brazil (319.30 million US dollars). 
The lowest ranked country is Lebanon with a counterfeiting revenue loss of only 1.6 million 
US dollars. However, looking at the sound recording and musical compositions revenue losses 
then Brazil shows the highest unauthorized copyright production of 300 million US dollars. In 
contrast, other countries, for instance Oman, Qatar, and Jordan, created revenue losses for US 
companies in these materials below 1 million US dollars. The estimated average US motion 
pictures counterfeiting revenue loss in the countries listed in the 301 Report is approximately 
29 million US dollars with the levels ranging from 0.5 million for Qatar to 250 million US 
dollars for the Russian Federation. 
  
Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Only recently, economists and policy analysts have begun to explore the determinants of 
intellectual property rights protection and violation. The studies take into account the different 
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contexts within which piracy occurs. Most studies investigated the patent-related industries 
and the business software applications industry. Few studies explore the differences in other 
creative industries’ piracy rates or estimated revenue losses at the country level. This paper 
tries to fill this gap. As a starting point for this study we use the findings of various works that 
investigate the cross-national differences of piracy in the copyright-based industries, 
contributing these differences to a country’s specific social, legal, and economic factors. The 
existing literature on the determinants of intellectual property rights violation can be 
summarized in the following conceptual framework (figure 1). 
 
------------Insert Figure 1 about here----------------- 
 
Broadly speaking four groups of variables influence the levels of piracy and the intellectual 
property rights protection in a country. First of all, many studies have investigated the 
relationship between a country’s economic situation and the intellectual property rights (in 
particular patent) protection. These studies include, among others, Rapp and Rozek (1990), 
Mansfield (1994), Ginarte and Park (1997), Maskus (1998), and Marron and Steel (2000). The 
literature indicates a relationship between market size and intellectual property rights 
protection. Large markets, in general, are attractive locations for inward foreign direct 
investments (Buckley and Casson, 1981). However, foreign direct investments are not 
attracted to places with weak intellectual property rights protection (Dunning, 1993; Lee and 
Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 1996). Furthermore, large markets also contain more opportunities 
for piracy, given that the identification of the unauthorized producers and users of the illegal 
products is more difficult than in smaller markets (Tang and Tunzelmann, 2000). In a large 
market even piracy at a small scale can create a considerable loss for the creative firms. To 
protect their businesses, these companies put pressure on host country governments to 
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strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights (Samuelson, 1999). They may retaliate 
with actions such as trade impediments, to ensure protection from piracy. This threat of 
retaliation increases with the size of the host market (Stegemann, 2000). Many larger 
countries therefore try to reduce the unauthorized production and use of intellectual property 
rights-related products. To examine the relationship between market size and piracy rates and 
revenue losses suffered by foreign copyright-based industries in a country, we suggest the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The larger the market size of a host country, the lower the piracy rates 
of copyright-based products. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The larger the market size of a host country, the higher the revenue 
losses suffered by foreign copyright-based industries. 
 
Furthermore, the overall level of economic development also influences the intellectual 
property rights protection. Burke (1996) and Marron and Steel (2000), for instance, indicate 
that the higher the level of economic development, the less likely that piracy occurs. This is 
also confirmed by Silva and Ramello (2000) who found strong evidence of the presence of a 
buoyant market of unauthorized reproduction of sound recording products in emerging and 
less developed regions. Similar results are found in studies focusing on the influence of social 
and economic conditions and the strength of economic institutions on software piracy. Marron 
and Steel (2000) found that countries with strong institutions protecting contracts and property 
also tend to have lower piracy rates. In general, countries that make inefficient public 
investments and economic policy decisions do not have protection systems or have weak ones 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). Ginarte and Park (1997) emphasize that indicators of political 
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credibility and economic development, such as market freedom and openness, are important 
determinants of the provision of property rights.  
The level of economic and social development, political credibility, and the security of legal 
rights are reflected in measurements of country risk (Oetzal, Bettis, and Zenner, 2001). The 
country risk measure determines the effect of possible political or economic events on the 
business climate in a country. Companies may experience less protection of the intellectual 
property rights in countries that are characterized by high risk, and are therefore likely to 
suffer considerable revenue losses. Moreover, the security of property and contractual rights 
and the efficiency is negatively related with the country risk. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Countries that are characterized by more political and economic risk 
exhibit higher piracy rates and revenue losses for foreign copyright-
based companies than countries with low risk characteristics. 
 
The second group of factors relates to the size of the user base of copyright related products 
(e.g. Givon, Mahajan and Muller, 1995; Slive and Bernhardt, 1998). The size of the user base 
becomes important when there is a positive consumption or network externality which exists 
if the utility for the product increases with piracy because it increases the number of other 
individuals using it (Takeyama, 1997; Shy and Thisse, 1999). The risk of piracy increases 
with the number of owners of complementary products - such as televisions, personal 
computers, CD-players – since they are potential users of copyright related products. For 
instance, Gallegos (1999) and Moorehouse (2001) indicated that Internet software piracy has 
increased considerably due to the explosive growth in the number of people that have access 
to the Internet and the advances in technology that have increased the ease and speed of 
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access to the Internet. Unlike the physical distribution of pirated software, the Internet allows 
pirated products to be transferred from a host computer to a PC without anyone’s knowledge. 
Similarly, Ostergard (2000) stressed that the great advances in technology have resulted in 
easier methods for duplicating that same technology and associated products. For instance, the 
introduction of video recorders in the consumer market has brought with it a capacity to 
duplicate videotapes, bringing about potentially massive violations of entertainment industry 
copyright protection. Likewise, Silva and Ramello (2000) indicated that the introduction of 
recording equipment by Philips and other producers in the late 1960s resulted in private music 
copying by individual consumers using their home equipment. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Countries that are characterized by a high density of computers exhibit 
higher piracy rates and revenue losses for foreign copyright-based 
companies than countries that have a low computer density. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In the motion picture video and entertainment industries, countries that 
are characterized by a high density of television sets exhibit higher 
piracy rates and revenue losses for foreign copyright-based companies 
than countries that have a low television density. 
 
The third group of determinants is related to the importance of trade in a country and its effect 
on the protection of copyright-based materials and fair market access. Open countries with 
high export shares have many domestic firms that need safeguarding of their own unique 
assets to remain competitive in the international arena (Gould and Gruben, 1996). These 
countries are more careful in their international relations because they are more dependent on 
them for economic growth. Therefore, they will be more inclined to respect intellectual 
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property rights of foreign firms due to the fear of repercussions (such as trade boycotts) in 
case they would violate international agreements (Stegemann, 2000; Stolpe, 2000). Thus, we 
expect that the piracy measures are negatively related with a country’s level of export. 
Another interesting measure is the share of high technology exports in total exports. It is a 
good indicator of the technology level of that particular country. The higher the level of 
technology, the more likely it is that unauthorized production and distribution of copyright-
based materials will take place since the skills and related technologies are available (see e.g. 
Marulidharan and Phatak, 1999; Ostergard, 2000). Important examples are CDs from the 
Philippines (Gonzales da Newman, 2001) and computer software from Hong Kong 
(Economist, 1998). When countries lack a minimum technology base, they will not be able to 
copy high technology products. We would therefore expect a positive relationship between the 
piracy measures and the share of high technology exports. We suggest the following 
hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 5: Countries that strongly depend on exports exhibit lower piracy rates 
and revenue losses for foreign copyright-based companies than 
countries that are less dependent on exports. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Countries that have a relatively large share of high-technology 
products in exports exhibit higher piracy rates and revenue losses for 
foreign copyright-based companies than countries that have a 
relatively small share of high-technology products in exports. 
 
The last essential group comprises of legal factors. Intellectual property rights protection has 
two components: a statute component and an enforcement component. We need to consider 
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both the strength of the laws and the enforcement of those laws to comprise the extension of 
intellectual property rights protection in a country (Samuelson, 1999; Ostergard, 2000). The 
enforcement of intellectual property rights embodies two tasks: preventing their infringement 
by free-riders and disciplining attempts by the rights holders to extend them beyond the terms 
of the grant (Maskus, 1998). For the enforcement of these laws, countries must have 
institutional structures and financial resources (Ostergard 2000). In empirical studies, 
intellectual property rights protection is frequently measured by the country’s membership of 
international conventions on the subject (Ginarte and Park, 1997). Burke (1996), for instance, 
tested the importance of convention membership on piracy levels in the audio software 
industry. Several international conventions (such as Berne 1887, Rome 1961, Geneva 
Phonogram 1971) have tried to enforce copyright protection for artists and producers in the 
music industry. Burke (1996) found that countries that are members of those convention 
agreements have lower piracy rates than countries that are not. We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The existence of an extensive copyright protection system in a country 
reduces the piracy rates and the revenue losses suffered by foreign 
copyright-based companies. 
 
 
The data 
The data set is composed of data from various sources. The primary sources we employ are 
the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and the World Bank. Both provide 
information regarding the characteristics of a country. The former provides data on the 
estimated copyright piracy rate levels and the associated estimated aggregate revenue losses 
15 
suffered by U.S. copyright-based industries in the countries that are listed on the special 301 
report 2001. The world development indicators database of the World Bank provides an 
extensive collection of data about social, financial, economic, and political indictors. For this 
study we use only those countries for which sufficient data are available from both sources. 
These countries are listed in table 3. 
 
------------Insert Table 3 about here----------------- 
  
The dependent variables are piracy rate and estimated revenue loss suffered by the four US 
creative industries due to piracy in each country in the analyses (see appendix A). In all 
regressions for the estimated suffered revenue losses in US dollars we will use the log value 
of the dependent variable revenue loss. Since revenue losses are defined as > 0, the use of the 
log value of specific revenue losses is an attractive feature. 
We include a country’s domestic market size to test hypotheses 1a and b. We proxy market 
size by the host country’s gross domestic product (GDP) following, for instance, Buckley and 
Casson (1981) and Lee and Mansfield (1996). Domestic market size will also be logged in all 
equations since we expect percentage differences in market size, rather than absolute dollar 
differences in GDP, to be linearly related to piracy rates and log value of the revenue losses 
due to piracy respectively.  
The level of exports is measured by the share of exports of goods and services in GDP. High 
technology exports are measured as the percentage of total manufactured exports made up by 
high technology products. The values of the number of PCs and the number of TVs per 1000 
persons are conversed into natural logarithm values. This procedure renders the relationships 
between rates and revenue losses and each of the explanatory variables in percentage terms, 
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either by definition of the variable itself as a percentage, or by transformation of the 
relationship to log values (Orr, 1974). 
The risk of a country is measured by the country risk rating published by Euromoney. 
Euromoney rates countries on a scale from 1 (very high risk) to 100 (no risk)iv.  
A variety of data sources on international legal protection for copyright-based materials were 
consulted to determine if protection is available in a particular country for either a U.S. or a 
foreign company. An index is constructed which indicates how strongly a country will 
provide intellectual property rights protection. The variable equals one if the country in 
question meets all the following three criteria: (a) protection is available under the national 
copyright law of a particular country; (b) patent protection is available in national law; (c) the 
country belongs to the maximum number (5) of intellectual property rights treaties. The 
involved five convention memberships are Berne Convention, Universal Copyright 
Convention, Paris Convention, European Patent Convention and Patent Cooperation Treatyv. 
Table 3 shows an overview of a country’s membership of the intellectual property rights 
treaties and if it has a national law for both copyright and patent protection as of 1998. To 
calculate the copyright protection system index, we recoded a membership into the value 1 
and also the existence of protection in the national laws (yes = 1) otherwise the value equals 0 
(no = 0). The protection value for a country is the number of conditions satisfied (number of 
1’s received) divided by the maximum number of conditions to be satisfied. The law index 
varies from one (strong protection) to zero (low protection). 
 
------------Insert Table 4 about here----------------- 
 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for the 44 countries in the sample. 
The mean value of the variable market size is 146.62 billion US dollars but the standard 
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deviation is high (249.15), with market size values ranging from 5.20 (for Estonia) to 1190.00 
billion US dollar (for Italy). The mean country risk rating is 0.52 but the standard deviation is 
high with values ranging from 0.23 (for Russian Federation) and 0.87 (for Italy). The reported 
number of PCs per 1000 persons is, on average, 53.72. This mean is low because a number of 
countries clearly demonstrate a low density of PCs. The minimum value belongs to India with 
less than 3 PCs per 1000 persons, while Israel shows the highest value of 217.39 PCs per 1000 
persons. All countries show a significantly higher density of televisions. The minimum figure 
for the density ratio is 47 TVs per 1000 persons (for Vietnam) compared to less than 3 
computers per 1000 persons for India. Mean exports of goods and services (as a percentage of 
GDP) in 1999 is 34.53 percent. The country with the lowest export ratio in the sample is 
Paraguay (2.22%), while Malaysia is the country with the highest export ratio (115.24%). 
Malaysia even exports more than its gross domestic product, signaling an open economy that 
is very dependent on trade. However, looking at the share of high-technology exports in the 
total manufactured exports, Paraguay is not ranked as lowest but Pakistan is, with a high-
technology share of only 0.12. The Philippines replace Malaysia as the top-seeded country 
considering high technology exports. On average, the share of high-technology exports of the 
countries in the sample is 11.39 percent. The copyright protection system index varies from 
no legislative protection (Kuwait) to strong protection (for instance, Greece, Italy, and Israel). 
The sample includes a substantial number of countries from different regions: East Europe 
(10), Asia (11), Middle East (8) and Latin America (13). It is clear that countries from 
Western Europe (2) and Africa (0) do not have the highest monitoring priority by the U.S. 
government. In Western Europe, overall the countries adequately and effectively protect US 
intellectual property rights and provide fair and equitable market access to US companies 
which produce copyright-based materials (see Yang, 1998; Markusen, 2001). In Africa, only 
few business activities occur, reducing the overall risk of piracy.  
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Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the model OLS estimations for piracy rates. We test our model 
for four US copyright-based industries where intellectual property rights protection matters: 
business software applications, sound recording and musical compositions, motion pictures, 
and entertainment software.  
 
------------Insert Table 5 about here----------------- 
 
Our first hypothesis 1a implies a negative relationship between market size and piracy rate. 
The results, however, show no clear relationship between market size and piracy rates. The 
second hypothesis based on the economic development and stability group literature argues 
that the level of piracy rates for the copyright-based products is positively associated with 
countries with high risk characteristics, such as political and economic instability. We do find 
that for all four industries low country risk results in significantly lower piracy rate, although 
entertainment software shows a weak relationship. Thus, the results support hypothesis two 
for the business software applications, recording and musical compositions, and motion 
pictures industries. Regarding the presence of related products we find that the presence of a 
high density of television sets in a country positively and significantly influences the motion 
pictures piracy rate. Hypothesis four is therefore supported for this particular creative 
industry. On the other hand, we do not find a clear effect of the penetration of PCs on the 
piracy rates in any of the four creative industries. We therefore find no support for hypothesis 
three in case of piracy rates.  
We also hypothesize that the countries depending on exports are more inclined to respect 
intellectual property of foreign firms. However, the results do not support the relationship 
between dependence on exports and copyright protection. We therefore cannot confirm 
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hypothesis five. In hypothesis six we argue that the higher the level of technology, the more 
likely that unauthorized production and distribution of copyright-based materials would take 
place since the skills and related technologies are available. However, no conclusive evidence 
is found for the relationship between a country’s technology level and the piracy rate for the 
studied four creative industries.  
Hypothesis seven argues that countries with strong copyright protection systems have low 
piracy rates. The estimates of the indicator for the country’s copyright protection system is 
negative and for two industries significantly different from zero. Thus, a sufficient legal 
system with strong copyright protection generally results in lower piracy rates. This effect is 
particularly strong and significant in case of the entertainment software industry and business 
software applications industry. Hence, these results confirm hypothesis seven. 
Interestingly, we find strong differences in piracy rates between regions in the world. Our 
benchmark region is Latin America. The estimates show that Western European and Asian 
countries demonstrate a higher illegal use of business software applications than their Latin 
American counterparts. Furthermore, the Eastern European countries show a larger inclination 
to copy entertainment software materials than countries in other regions. 
 
------------Insert Table 6 about here----------------- 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the model OLS estimations for revenue losses suffered by the 
four US copyright-based industries abroad. When considering the estimated dollar revenue 
losses for US firms due to piracy in other countries we find related, though slightly different, 
results as for piracy rates. First of all, contrary to the results for piracy rates, we now find 
strong evidence of a positive influence of the market size of the host country and the 
estimated revenue losses of US creative companies resulting from illegal copying of business 
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software applications, entertainment software, sound recording and musical compositions and 
music pictures industries. The estimates of market size therefore strongly support hypothesis 
1b.  
The results on country risk are conflicting. In case of the motion pictures industry, it confirms 
our expectation that higher stability results in a decline of revenue losses for US companies. 
However, we find that in case of business software applications, it actually results in an 
increase in revenue losses. Therefore, hypothesis two cannot be generally accepted for these 
four copyright-based industries studied.  
Regarding the density of television sets we again find evidence that supports hypothesis four 
in case of the motion pictures industry. In this particular industry a high penetration of 
television sets therefore results in an increase in estimated revenue losses.  Again we find that 
the density of PCs in a country has no influence on the estimated revenue losses in any of 
these four copyright-based industries. Thus, hypothesis three about the effect of the 
penetration of PCs on the estimated suffered revenue losses due to piracy is not supported.  
Furthermore, the estimate of the indicator for country’s export dependence is only positive 
and significant in case of the business software applications industry. This result is surprising 
because hypothesis five argues that a country with a high export ratio has an incentive to 
protect intellectual property right-based products of foreign companies. For the motion 
pictures industry we find that countries with high technology exports significantly and 
positively influence the estimated revenue losses suffered by US companies. It is relatively 
easy to copy motion pictures and videos once a country has a certain level of technological 
development. Thus, hypothesis six is partly supported. 
We also hypothesize that a strong system to protect copyrights in a host country has a positive 
impact on the revenue losses of foreign copyright-based companies due to illegal copying of 
their products (hypothesis seven). The estimates of the indicator of a country’s copyright 
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protection system are not significantly different for zero. Thus, hypothesis seven is not 
supported for the estimated revenue losses of US companies due to piracy. 
Again, we find considerable differences in the effect of specific regions. For US firms in 
copyright-based industries, the likelihood of a revenue loss due to business software 
applications piracy is significantly smaller in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East than 
in Latin American countries. In the entertainment software industry we find evidence that 
countries in Eastern Europe show the highest likelihood of revenue losses for US companies 
due to piracy of entertainment materials. Furthermore, the regions Asia and Middle East 
behave differently from the other regions, in particular in comparison with Latin America, in 
the sound recording and musical compositions industry and motion pictures industry 
respectively. The estimate of Asia is negative, while the estimate of the Middle East is 
positive and significant different from zero. 
 
Discussion 
To determine the cross national variation in piracy rates and the resulting estimated revenue 
losses for US copyright-based industries (business software applications, recording and 
musical compositions, motion pictures, and entertainment software), we have considered four 
groups of variables as identified by previous studies (e.g. Burke, 1996; Husted, 2000; Marron 
and Steel, 2000): economic development and stability, penetration of related products, trade 
relations, and legal factors. This section discusses the most important findings of our study. In 
doing so, it is important to emphasize that only a sample of countries is listed on the special 
301 report. These countries have the highest monitoring priority by the US government. This 
decision is based on the weakness of their intellectual property rights protection system, 
particularly for copyrights. Furthermore, the piracy data are only based on four US copyright-
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based industries. This implies that some caution has to be taken into account for the 
generalization of the findings. 
Regarding the economic variables, the results of our analyses strongly support the hypothesis 
that in larger markets, the estimated revenue losses suffered by US copyright-based 
companies due to unauthorized (re)production and distribution of their copyright-related 
materials in large host markets are considerable, even when these countries are characterised 
by relatively low piracy rates. Therefore, even though host countries may have relatively low 
piracy rates, the overall estimated revenue losses suffered by foreign copyright-based 
companies due to piracy in these economies are not necessarily negligible. This result is in 
line with Tang and Tunzelmann (2000) who emphasize that large markets offer many 
opportunities for piracy, given that the identification of the unauthorized producers and users 
of the illegal products is more difficult in larger than in smaller markets. Even piracy at a 
small scale can then create a considerable loss for the creative firm.   
We find no significant relationship between market size and piracy rates. Even though most 
studies indicate that larger countries will have better intellectual property rights protection out 
of fear for retaliation (Samuelson, 1999; Stegemann, 2000) or to remain an attractive location 
for FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1981; Dunning, 1993; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Seyoum, 
1996), this expectation is not confirmed in our study. This can be explained by the fact that 
other factors related to market size capture the economic situation of the country better than 
market size measured by GDP. For instance, Ginarte and Park (1997), Husted (2000) and 
Marron and Steel (2000) emphasized that it is not only one variable indicating the level of 
economic development per se that influences the provision of intellectual property rights, but 
rather an group of determinants of economic development, such as income, stability and 
political climate, demand for luxury goods, technology level, market size, and market access 
and openness. 
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To capture these elements, this study therefore also considered country risk as a potential 
explanation for piracy rates and losses. It is measured as a combination of economic 
performance, political stability, access to domestic markets, and a country’s debt situation. In 
general, the evidence shows that countries that have a high-risk profile offer little protection 
of copyrights, resulting in high piracy rates, particularly in the business software application, 
recording and musical compositions, and motion pictures industries. This result confirms 
Ginarte and Park (1997). Countries that are very risky are therefore uninteresting locations for 
business activities of US firms in the copyright-based industries. For piracy rates, the risk 
variable therefore captures the elements mentioned by Marron and Steel (2000).  
The results regarding the actual estimated revenue losses are conflicting. Contrary to our 
expectation, we find that for the business software applications industries low risk countries 
are actually associated with large revenue losses suffered by foreign creative companies due 
to piracy in this industry. This surprising phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that 
relatively developed and stable economies have enough resources to invest in (copying) 
business software materials. In general, state of the art business software applications products 
are developed and used in countries with high technology knowledge industries. These 
countries are characterized by low risk. Thus, it is likely that revenue losses suffered by 
copyright-based companies due to piracy of their products are the highest in these (stable) 
countries. 
The second group of variables we considered in our conceptual model is the penetration of 
related products. Our results confirm the expectation that the risk of piracy increases with the 
number of owners of complementary products, which is in line with previous studies by 
Takeyama (1997) and Shy and Thisse (1999). This is particularly true in case of the motion 
pictures industry for the spread of televisions. The fact that many households possess TVs and 
recording equipments encourages the illegal copying of videos.  
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However, at the same time we find that the penetration of computers has no significant effect 
on the piracy rates and losses occurring in any of the four studied industries. We attribute this 
result to the fact that computers are still a relatively new phenomenon. They are not nearly as 
wide-spread as televisions are and not every household currently has access to a computer, the 
Internet, or the necessary software to engage in illegal activities, in particular for the countries 
listed on the 301 report. 
The third group of factors considered in this study is trade-related measures. The results for 
the two variables introduced here are disappointing. We find no proof for the hypothesis that 
exporting countries exhibit lower piracy rates and losses. This result is not in line with 
Stegemann (2000) and Stolpe (2000). In addition, only for the motion picture industry we find 
that high technology exports do encourage financial losses due to illegal copying. This result 
confirms for all the sample countries the earlier finding of Gonzales da Newman (2001) for 
CD piracy in the Philippines. 
It is important to stress that the majority of countries in our sample are middle-income 
countries. Particularly many middle-income countries, even when they are export-oriented, 
still have problems accepting the legitimacy of the monopoly claims over intellectual property 
as asserted by companies. Maskus (1998) emphasized that middle-income countries indeed 
may weaken their protection systems because they have the ability to imitate new technology 
that can help to stimulate their economy. Many countries in our sample will therefore, even 
though they export a lot and could fear for retaliation, prefer to allow piracy. Only when 
economies move from the middle-income to the high-income group, intellectual property 
rights protection usually increases sharply.  
In addition, intellectual property rights protection is a tremendously fluid concept strongly 
affected by cultural values. It is very much rooted in the Western cultural values of liberalism 
and individual rights, which are less important in many of our sample countries. Indeed, the 
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largest differences in intellectual property rights protection occur along the North-South lines 
(e.g. Yang, 1998; Husted, 2000). Table 3 confirms that for instance the Arab countries (Saudi 
Arabia, Oman, Kuwait) have very little intellectual property protection. Countries that do not 
value liberalism and individual rights very highly, will have less scruples about piracy.   
The theoretical debate of the effect of the technology level of a country on piracy is still 
undecided. Our present results are in line with Marron and Steel (2000), who found no 
convincing evidence for the effect of technology on piracy. However, despite these results, 
many innovative firms do perceive substantial revenue losses in foreign markets from illegal 
copying (Maskus, 1998). The opportunities for international free riding have increased 
because technologies for copying software, entertainment products, books, transmissions, and 
certain technologies have become cheaper and more reliable. This development has therefore 
increased the pressure for strong international standards on intellectual property rights 
protection (Maskus, 1998). As a consequence, each member of the World Trade Organization 
has agreed to develop an intellectual property rights system according to minimum standard. 
However, for the period under investigation here, the countries still had time to meet the 
obligations. The results therefore may not be visible yet.  
Finally, we considered legal factors. Technological advantage is among the US creative 
companies’ most important strengths, as it is for most multinational enterprises. Slack 
intellectual property rights protection in host countries can lead to a rapid erosion of this key 
advantage. Locating R&D in a host country with lower intellectual property protection levels 
increases the multinational enterprise’s exposure to the possibility of losing technological 
secrets and advantages to local competitors (see e.g. Muralidharan and Phatak, 1999). An 
extensive copyright protection system can help to protect the intellectual property of these 
companies. Our evidence shows that the existence of a strong protection system in a host 
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country indeed reduces the piracy rates of various foreign copyright-related materials (in 
particular business software applications and entertainment software).    
In this study we treated the four different copyright-based industries almost as 
undifferentiated. However, it is likely that differences exist between the industries that were 
not considered here. Further research should pay attention to the specificity of each context 
and should try to extent the number of countries in the sample. Another interesting research 
focus would be to investigate whether the universal consideration regarding the findings for 
patent-related products and industries are also valid for copyright-related products and 
industries. Given this research agenda, our contribution has certain limitations but it also 
provides us with some interesting answers to a number of relevant questions regarding the 
determinants of piracy taking country characteristics into account. 
We implicitly modelled that individual countries select their copyright protection policy as a 
result of economic and legal conditions. Observed piracy rates and the estimated revenue 
losses suffered by copyright-based companies due to piracy are the outcome of these policies, 
their implementation, and the response of individuals and companies to them. An alternative 
approach, not adopted here, would be to analyse how individuals decide whether to pirate 
copyright-related products based on the costs and benefits facing them. 
 
Conclusion 
The piracy rates of copyright-related products and the revenue losses suffered by US 
copyright-related companies due to illegal production and distribution of their products abroad 
show considerable differences between countries/regions but also between the different kinds 
of copyright-based industries. The purpose of this study was to examine these cross-national 
variations in piracy of U.S. copyright-related products in four creative industries: business 
software applications, recording & musical compositions, motion pictures, and entertainment 
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software. We considered four groups of country-specific variables, economic development 
and stability, legal issues, trade relations, and penetration of related products, to explain the 
cross-national piracy differences for these creative industries. It is shown that the 
disaggregation of the profile of a country is helpful in analyzing the piracy issue around the 
world.  
Our most remarkable finding concerns the differences among the determinants of piracy rates 
and the resulting revenue losses suffered by US copyright based industries due to piracy. We 
find that a large market size of a host country results in higher revenue losses for the creative 
industries, even if the piracy rates in these industries are relatively low. Furthermore, we find 
that, in general, low risk countries show lower piracy rates and that the revenue losses 
suffered by US companies producing and selling copyright-related products in these countries 
are positively related with the risk, with one exception: revenue losses due to business 
software applications piracy. The evidence shows significant differences in piracy between 
separate regions in the world. Taken together, these results suggest that individual countries 
select their copyright protection policy as a function of economic, legal and social conditions, 
as well as differences in cultural traditions. The observed countries’ piracy rates for the US 
copyright-based industries and the revenue losses suffered by US companies due to piracy in 
these industries are the outcome of these policies and their implementation.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of countries’ copyright piracy rates of US copyright-based 
products in 1999 (in percentage) 
 Sample of 
Countries 
Mean 
piracy rate 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Business Software 
Applications 
 
39 
 
69.69 
 
15.00 
 
42.00 
 
98.00 
Recording & Musical 
Compositions  
43 50.65 25.40 8.00 95.00 
Motion Pictures 44 61.34 26.21 15.00 100.00 
Entertainment Software 37 78.46 15.60 50.00 99.00 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of foreign copyright piracy revenue losses suffered by US 
copyright-based industries in 1999 (in millions of US dollars) 
 Sample of 
Countries 
Mean 
Loss 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Business Software 
Applications  
 
39 
 
69.06 
 
98.04 
 
1.60 
 
437.20 
Recording & Musical 
Compositions  
43 37.40 66.60 0.10 300.00 
Motion Pictures  44 28.64 48.34 0.50 250.00 
Entertainment Software 37 80.63 226.82 0.10 1382.50 
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Table 3 
Overview of countries monitored by IIPA, their membership of intellectual property right treaties, and the protection 
of intellectual property rights under national laws 
Intellectual Property Right Treaties Existence of National 
Protection Law 
Country 
Berne 
Convention 
Universal 
Copyright 
Convention 
Paris 
Convention 
European 
Patent 
Convention 
Patent 
Cooperation 
Treaty 
Copyright 
Protection 
Law 
Patent 
Protection 
Law 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Chile Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
China Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Colombia Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Costa Rica Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Dominican Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Egypt Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
El Salvador Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Estonia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Guatemala Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
India Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Indonesia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Israel Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jordan Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Korea Republic Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Kuwait No No No No No No No 
Latvia Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Lebanon Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Lithuania (OCR) Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Malaysia Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Oman Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Pakistan Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
Paraguay Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Peru Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Philippines Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Poland Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Qatar Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Romania Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Russian Federation Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Saudi Arabia No Yes No No No Yes No 
Slovakia Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Taiwan No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand Yes No No No No Yes No 
Turkey Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Ukraine Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Uruguay Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Venezuela Republic Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Vietnam No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Source: Fenwick and West (2000), IIPA (2001) and WIPO (2001). 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
  Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Domestic 
market in 
Millions US 
dollars 
  
 
44 
 
 
146.62 
 
 
249.15 
 
 
5.20 
 
 
1190.00 
Country risk 
rating 
  
44 
 
0.52 
 
0.13 
 
0.23 
 
0.87 
Number of PC / 
1000 persons 
  
43 
 
53.72 
 
52.07 
 
2.75 
 
217.39 
Number of TV / 
1000 persons 
  
42 
 
285.76 
 
167.11 
 
47.00 
 
675.00 
Export of goods 
& Services (% 
of GDP) 
  
42 
 
34.53 
 
21.88 
 
2.22 
 
115.24 
High-
technology 
exports (% of 
manufactured 
exports) 
  
 
42 
 
 
11.39 
 
 
14.84 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
71.98 
Country 
copyright 
protection 
system 
  
 
44 
 
 
0.57 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
1.00 
Region       
 Western 
Europe 
 
44 
 
0.045 
 
0.21 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 Eastern 
Europe 
 
44 
 
0.23 
 
0.42 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 Asia 44 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
 Middle 
East 
 
44 
 
0.18 
 
0.39 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 Latin 
America 
 
44 
 
0.30 
 
0.46 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
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Table 5 
Results of the industry models explaining the copyright piracy rates of US creative 
industries in different countries in 1999 
 
 
Variables 
 Business 
Software 
Applications 
Recording & 
Musical 
compositions 
Motion 
pictures 
Entertainment 
Software 
Constant  130.795*** 
(12.681) 
123.500*** 
(5.323) 
39.658 
(1.011) 
103.558*** 
(3.476) 
Domestic market  -1.969 
(1.072) 
0.125 
(0.032) 
-5.111 
(1.463) 
1.713 
(0.739) 
Country risk rating  -72.601*** 
(3.312) 
-93.248* 
(1.858) 
-89.349* 
(1.963) 
-37.011 
(1.262) 
Number of PCs per 
1000 persons 
 -2.321 
(0.881) 
-979 
(0.167) 
-4.845 
(0.791) 
0.866 
(0.215) 
Number of TV per 
1000 persons 
 ------- ------- 19.328** 
(2.691) 
0.415 
(0.082) 
Export of goods & 
Services (% of 
GDP) 
 -0.067 
(0.469) 
-0.314 
(1.008) 
0.119 
(0.398) 
-0.062 
(0.309) 
High-technology 
exports (% of 
manufactured 
exports) 
 0.065 
(0.399) 
0.076 
(0.207) 
-0.011 
(0.032) 
0.102 
(0.465) 
Country copyright 
protection system 
 -22.581* 
(1.881) 
-22.158 
(0.814) 
-8.855 
(0.338) 
-44.368** 
(2.638) 
Region      
 Western 
Europe 
31.991*** 
(2.901) 
22.584 
(0.893) 
-6.823 
(0.293) 
14.975 
(0.982) 
 Eastern 
Europe 
2.139 
(0.347) 
5.976 
(0.458) 
-15.552 
(1.233) 
20.717** 
(2.536) 
 Asia 9.537 
(1.386) 
-6.221 
(0.405) 
20.050 
(1.338) 
15.617 
(1.450) 
 Middle 
East 
12.546** 
(2.096) 
0.970 
(0.075) 
6.422 
(0.547) 
-7.110 
(0.904) 
      
Number of 
countries 
 35 39 38 34 
R2-adjusted  0.545 0.153 0.341 0.341 
*** significant at 1 percent level; 
** significant at 5 percent level; 
* significant at 10 percent level 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Results of the industry models explaining the US creative industries revenue losses in a 
country due to copyright piracy in 1999 
 
 
Variables 
 Business 
Software 
Applications 
Recording & 
Musical 
compositions  
Motion 
picture  
Entertainment 
Software 
Constant  -1.239*** 
(3.347) 
0.899 
(0.709) 
-2.761** 
(2.552) 
-1.595 
(0.529) 
Domestic market  0.994*** 
(15.094) 
0.742*** 
(3.539) 
1.109*** 
(11.510) 
1.294*** 
(5.517) 
Country risk rating  2.004** 
(2.548) 
-2.813 
(1.026) 
-3.368** 
(2.683) 
-1.558 
(0.526) 
Number of PCs per 
1000 persons 
 -0.166 
(1.609) 
0.264 
(0.823) 
-0.061 
(0.361) 
0.611 
(1.502) 
Number of TV per 
1000 persons 
 ---------- ---------- 0.417** 
(2.105) 
-0.308 
(0.599) 
Export of goods & 
Services (% of 
GDP) 
 0.010* 
(1.947) 
-0.023 
(1.350) 
0.006 
(0.671) 
-0.003 
(0.143) 
High-technology 
exports (% of 
manufactured 
exports) 
 0.002 
(0.374) 
0.031 
(1.516) 
0.018* 
(1.959) 
-0.001 
(0.143) 
Country copyright 
protection system 
 0.256 
(0.595) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.537 
(0.744) 
-2.640 
(1.552) 
Region      
 West 
Europe 
-1.212*** 
(3.063) 
-0.747 
(0.541) 
0.679 
(1.058) 
0.561 
(0.364) 
 East 
Europe 
-0.431* 
(1.945) 
0.182 
(0.255) 
0.252 
(0.724) 
1.497* 
(1.812) 
 Asia -0.791*** 
(3.202) 
-1.770** 
(2.111) 
0.025 
(0.061) 
1.781 
(1.635) 
 Middle 
East 
-0.993*** 
(4.625) 
-0.860 
(1.225) 
0.865** 
(2.672) 
-0.343 
(0.431) 
      
Number of 
countries 
 35 39 38 34 
R2-adjusted  0.926 0.407 0.905 0.650 
*** significant at 1 percent level; 
** significant at 5 percent level; 
* significant at 10 percent level 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix A 
 
This appendix describes the estimated piracy rates and associated revenue losses suffered by 
US copyright-based companies. Data were obtained entirely from archival sources (see also 
IIPA (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)).  
Business Software Applications 
Data regarding the rates of software piracy and the associated revenue losses were provided 
by the Business Software Alliance (BSA). The trade group estimates piracy rates by 
comparing business software applications installed (demand) and business software 
applications legally shipped (supply). Piracy rates are defined as the volume of software 
pirated as a percentage of total software installed in each country.  The rates are reported as 
percentages, with 0% indicating no piracy, and 100% indicating all business software is 
pirated. Given the fact that a great deal of software is sold without the computer hardware, it 
is plausible to assume that the BSA data underestimates the rate of business software piracy.  
The estimation of revenue dollar losses suffered by the US companies due to piracy of their 
business software products is calculated by multiplying the shortfall between the actual and 
the expected sales of software purchased together with a personal computer, by the number of 
PCs sold, by using the average price per business software application. This is a wholesale 
price estimate, weighted by the volume of shipments within each software application 
category. The revenue loss data have to be used with some caution, because the expected sales 
of software depend on the used method and no price differentiation is included in the model. 
Despite the limitations, the reported BSA piracy data are one of the most commonly accepted 
indicators in the industry. 
Sound Recording and Musical Compositions 
The national piracy rates and the revenue losses suffered by US companies were calculated by 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA). This is a trade group that represents 
the U.S. recording industry. The RIAA bases its estimates on local surveys of the market 
conditions in each country. The numbers produced by the music industry generally reflect the 
value of sales of pirated products rather than industry losses. If data is available about piracy 
recordings that emanate from a third country, this loss data is included in the loss numbers for 
the country of manufacture, rather than the country of sale. Furthermore, if possible, RIAA 
employs economic data to project the likely import or sale of legitimate sound recordings, 
rather than merely reporting pirate sales. In these cases, projected unit displacement is 
multiplied by the wholesale price of legitimate products in that market rather than the retail 
price of the pirate products. 
Motion Pictures 
The motion pictures industry relies mainly on in-depth knowledge of the particular markets to 
determine the piracy figures country by country. The nature and impact of piracy in particular 
markets depends on the level of development of various media in the markets and the different 
release periods of a product into various media. Since the motion pictures markets are inter-
dependent, piracy in one media form has externalities for other media forms. The total effect 
of piracy spills over on the revenue losses in other markets depend on the judgment of the 
professionals in the motion picture industry. To estimate the piracy rates (in percentages) and 
revenue US dollar losses the industry is divided into three segments: video (encompassing 
movies provided in video cassette as well as in all optical disc formats); television, cable and 
satellite; public performance. The data provided by the IIPA are the only data available for 
this industry. 
Entertainment Software 
The US trade association of the entertainment software industry, Interactive Digital Software 
Association (IDSA), provided the piracy data. Separate estimates of piracy rates pertaining to 
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console- and PC-based software are calculated and then averaged into a single piracy rate 
based on the prevalence of each platform in the market. US companies and other parties 
related to the entertainment software businesses estimated the individual piracy rates. Piracy 
rates range from 0% to 100%. The piracy data are probably biased in favor of the industry. 
Revenue dollar loss estimates are generated using proprietary methodologies that integrate 
market data of dedicated platform and PC entertainment software in both compact disc and 
cartridge formats and hardware shipments. The calculation also took into account the effects 
of enforcement actions in the countries of production, export and import. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that pirated entertainment software products in the market displace to some degree 
legitimate product sales. The displaced sales are multiplied by the wholesale price. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the methodology of piracy figures does not take into account 
the strategic behavior of companies to encourage piracy. Companies that stimulate piracy of 
the products should experience lower revenue losses due to unauthorized production and use 
of their products.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i  We use estimations of the incurred revenue losses due to piracy provided by the industry associations of the 
four selected US copyright-based industries. Usually, these associations assume a one-to-one pirate sale- 
legitimate sale relationship. This may result in an overestimation of the actual loss. Pirate products are cheaper 
and therefore can occupy segments of the market that are not reached with the higher legitimate price. We 
acknowledge the limitation of the data. However, given that no other data are available, we have decided to use 
the provided figures for our study. 
ii Furthermore, IIPA releases studies on countries that continue to have high levels of piracy that directly affect 
the U.S. jobs and economic growth. 
iii We exclude the creative industry that produces textbooks, professional publications, and journals (both in 
electronic and print media). The IIPA only publishes the estimated revenue losses due to piracy and not the 
piracy rates for this industry.  
iv Euromoney country risk ratings are based on nine weighted categories that access country risk, covering 
economic performance, political risk, debt, and access to financial and capital markets. These include economic 
data (25%), political risk (25%), debt indicators (10%), debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit rating (10%), 
access to bank finance (5%), access to short-term finance (5%), and access to capital markets (5%). The rates are 
composed of polls of economists and political analysts supplemented by quantitative data (see e.g. Oetzel, Bettis 
and Zenner, 2001). 
v  Software can be protected against piracy by using copyrights and patents. When software related invention is 
only a mathematical algorithm, such as a computer program designed to convert binary-coded decimal numbers 
into binary numbers, then the invention is not eligible patent protection. However, if the invention utilizes the 
device to manipulate numbers that represent concrete, real world values then the invention is a process relating to 
those real world concepts and is patentable. However, copyrights are the strongest legal protection instrument to 
be used in the fight to globally reduce software piracy (Tysver, 2000). 
